I8: Risks to digital and communication systems

Riosgan do shiostaman didseatach agus conaltraidh

This risk concerns the vulnerability of digital and communication systems in the Highland region to climate-related disruptions, particularly from weather-induced damage, power outages, and failures affecting dispersed, infrastructure-poor rural networks.

Current Level of Risk (2025)

Medium

Future Level of Risk (2050s/2080s)

Medium

Urgency

Yes

Priority for regional collaboration?

Yes

Confidence in Current Evidence

Confidence in the available evidence base for this risk is moderate. It includes authoritative national reviews and connectivity data that provide a strong, high-level picture of current and future vulnerabilities. Confidence is limited by the scarcity of Highland-specific resilience assessments and the recognised national-level gaps in monitoring and evaluating technology climate risks.

Known Evidence and Knowledge Gaps

Evidence from national assessments highlights clear exposure of digital and communication systems to extreme weather, alongside documented weaknesses in redundancy, contingency planning, and backup power provision. However, significant gaps remain, including the absence of system-level indicators, limited data on asset-level vulnerabilities in rural areas, and inconsistent monitoring of interdependencies across energy, transport, and digital networks.

Overview

Many future climate risks to digital and communication systems in the Highlands arise from the region’s reliance on long stretches of overhead lines, isolated mobile masts and geographically constrained backhaul routes. Because large areas of the Highlands depend on mobile networks rather than full-fibre connections, the resilience of 4G infrastructure is essential; yet 16% of residents (over 40,000 people) still lack access to digital broadband, primarily in remote rural areas where national programmes remain hardest to deliver. Projected increases in storms, heavy rainfall and prolonged power cuts are likely to heighten the probability of service outages and associated cascading impacts. While some rural masts have backup generators, this provision is not universal or designed for extended failures. Expanding low-Earth-orbit satellite services, already trialled in northern Scotland, may offer an increasingly valuable layer of redundancy for remote and island communities, supporting connectivity where terrestrial networks remain fragile.

 

What is the current level of risk?

Digital and communication systems in the Highland region operate within a challenging environment shaped by dispersed settlements, complex terrain, and longstanding gaps in high-capacity connectivity. The Highland Council estimates that 16% of residents (over 40,000 people) still lack access to digital broadband, with rollout programmes progressing more slowly than in other parts of Scotland.[1] Work patterns further reinforce digital reliance: pre-pandemic census data already recorded 35,325 home-based workers in Highland, indicating substantial dependence on resilient digital infrastructure for livelihoods and public service access.[2] These structural factors together heighten the region’s exposure to disruption and magnify the consequences of outages.

Extreme weather events, particularly storms, high winds, coastal surges, and prolonged power outages, pose immediate risks to the reliability of mobile masts, fibre cabinets, subsea and trunk backhaul routes, and rural broadband systems.[3] Contingency arrangements for weather-related outages and the level of system redundancy remain insufficiently characterised, with indicators of telecoms resilience yet to be developed.[4]

Power dependency remains the most significant vulnerability: storm-related electricity failures can disrupt digital services even where physical telecoms assets remain intact. Current resilience provision is limited. The Highland Council notes that around two-thirds of the population would only be able to make mobile emergency calls for up to one hour during a power cut, compared with the 24 hours or more of standby power provided by PSTN exchanges, illustrating a material decline in emergency communications resilience as networks transition to digital systems.[5],[6] National reviews emphasise that indicators for redundancy, contingency planning, and system-level telecoms resilience are not yet developed, with rural networks particularly exposed due to limited backhaul diversity and single points of failure. These factors increase the likelihood that climate-related damage or power outages will result in multi-community digital outages with broader social, economic, and emergency-response implications.[7]

What is the future level of risk?

Climate risks to digital and communication systems in the Highland region are expected to intensify as the frequency and severity of extreme weather events increases. National assessments emphasise growing exposure of telecoms and ICT infrastructure to climatic hazards, with insufficient indicators currently available to track resilience or anticipate future vulnerabilities.[8] In the Highland region, where digital connectivity depends on long stretches of overhead lines, isolated mobile masts, and geographically constrained backhaul routes, projected increases in storms, heavy rainfall, and associated power disruptions are likely to heighten the risk of service outages.[9]

Storm-related failures in the electricity supply are a particular concern, as digital networks at every level rely on a consistent power supply. While some rural masts have been fitted with backup generators, this provision is neither universal nor designed for prolonged outages.[10] Future climate conditions may increase the duration of disruptions following major weather events, raising the risk of cascading failures in which power outages lead to connectivity failures across multiple communities.[11]

Projected increases in heavy rainfall and flooding could also affect key network assets such as fibre cabinets, data-handling sites, and roadside infrastructure, especially where drainage is already constrained. For remote communities served by single trunk or subsea links, future hazards may compound existing fragilities, increasing the likelihood that localised damage results in wide-area connectivity loss.[12]

Satellite connectivity is expected to play a significantly larger role in this evolving risk landscape. National evidence indicates that satellite broadband is an increasingly important option for households and businesses in areas where terrestrial connectivity remains challenging.[13] The rapid expansion of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations offers the potential for more resilient links that are less dependent on ground infrastructure vulnerable to storms, flooding, or landslides. Early trials in northern Scotland, such as the use of Starlink technology on ScotRail routes, demonstrate the growing feasibility of satellite solutions in remote and high-latitude environments.[14] Continued market growth and increased service availability could provide a vital layer of redundancy for the Highlands, especially for isolated settlements, islands, and properties currently dependent on single terrestrial connections. However, satellite systems will still rely on local power supplies and equipment, meaning they are complementary rather than a substitute for the wider adoption of ground-based digital and energy networks.[15]

Rising temperatures may place additional stress on data-handling equipment and localised server environments, particularly where cooling systems are limited.

 

Is the risk being managed or adapted to?

Current efforts to manage climate-related risks to digital and communication systems in the Highland region remain partial and uneven, with significant gaps identified in national assessments. The UK Climate Change Committee notes that Scotland lacks system-level indicators to monitor telecoms and information and communications technology resilience, including redundancy, backup power provision, and contingency planning for weather-related outages.[16] As a result, adaptation activity is difficult to assess comprehensively, though some programmes incorporate resilience considerations.

Relevant national programmes include the Scottish 4G Infill Programme, which has expanded rural mobile coverage and installed backup generators at a subset of mast sites, offering limited protection against power loss.[17],[18] Figure I7 shows the active sites for this programme, with almost half in the Highland region. The Shared Rural Network commitments also support long-term improvements in mobile coverage across remote areas.[19]

Within the Highland region, modernisation of information and communication technology infrastructure has improved redundancy, the ability to create virtual simulations of disaster events, and disaster recovery functions for public-sector systems.[20] These upgrades reduce vulnerability to environmental hazards affecting legacy equipment and enhance continuity during localised disruptions.

More broadly, national digital strategies emphasise secure, reliable digital public services, improved cloud adoption, and sector-wide cyber resilience, all of which indirectly support adaptation by strengthening the robustness of digital infrastructure.[21] However, the explicit integration of climate risk into telecoms planning remains limited, and coordination between the UK, the Scottish Government, and the Highland Council on resilience standards is still underdeveloped.

 

Figure I7. Scottish 4G Infill Programme: Location map of programme sites. Correct as of April 2024. Source: Scottish Government Digital Directive (2025).

 

Are there benefits from further action in the next five years, over and above what is already planned?

National assessments highlight substantial evidence gaps regarding the vulnerability of telecoms and information and communication technology infrastructure, as well as the absence of indicators for redundancy, contingency planning, and system-wide interdependencies.[23] Addressing these gaps through improved monitoring, risk mapping, and asset-level assessments could enable more proactive, better-targeted adaptation measures across Highland.

Strengthening backup power provision at rural mobile masts, fibre cabinets, and public-sector digital facilities could reduce the likelihood of service loss during storm-related outages.[24] Additional investment in diversified backhaul routes, particularly for communities reliant on single trunk or subsea links, would reduce the scale of disruptions from localised damage.[25]

Further action could also ensure that digital transformation programmes incorporate climate-risk considerations more systematically. Expanding resilient cloud-hosting arrangements and continuing to modernise information and communication technology infrastructure could strengthen operational continuity.[26] Embedding resilience standards across connectivity programmes, in partnership with UK and Scottish regulators, could help ensure digital systems remain robust as climate pressures intensify.

 

Cascading and Interacting Risks

Cascading and interacting risks to digital and communication systems in the Highland region arise from the sector’s strong dependencies on other critical infrastructure, particularly electricity, transport access, and emergency response systems.[27] There is currently no systemic assessment of cascading failures across infrastructure networks in Scotland, limiting understanding of how shocks in one sector can propagate into digital connectivity loss.[28] In Highland, where settlements are dispersed and infrastructure networks are spatially constrained, these interactions take on greater significance.

Power outages triggered by storms, flooding or high winds can rapidly translate into digital outages, as mobile masts, fibre cabinets and local data-handling equipment rely on a continuous electricity supply. Limited backup generation in rural areas increases the risk that prolonged disruptions cascade across multiple communities, affecting emergency communications, health and social care delivery, and access to digital public services.[29] Transport disruptions caused by severe weather can also delay repairs to damaged network assets, particularly where access to remote masts or roadside cabinets is restricted.

Single points of failure in backhaul routes, common in remote parts of the region, amplify the risk that geographically localised damage results in wider loss of service.[30] Dependence on cloud-based public services further links digital resilience to the robustness of data-centre operations and national-level infrastructure.[31] These multi-layered dependencies mean that failures in energy, transport or public service systems can rapidly intersect with and magnify digital disruptions.[32]

 

Options for regional collaboration

  • Enhance emergency communication arrangements, integrating digital outage scenarios into local resilience planning.
  • Improve access and repair logistics for remote digital infrastructure, coordinating with transport and emergency services to reduce delays in restoring connectivity following severe weather events.

 

References

[1] The Highland Council, “Digital Connectivity,” May 29, 2025, https://www.highland.gov.uk/meetings.

[2] Scotland’s Census, “Highland Census,” www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk, 2022, https://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/webapi/jsf/tableView/tableView.xhtml.

[3] Ofcom, “Shared Rural Networks Coverage Obligations,” 12, 2024, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources.

[4] Climate Change Committee, “Adapting to Climate Change: Progress in Scotland” (Climate Change Committee, November 2023), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Adapting-to-climate-change-Progress-in-Scotland-Web.pdf.

[5] The Highland Council, “Digital Connectivity,” May 29, 2025, https://www.highland.gov.uk/meetings.

[6] Justice Directorate, The Scottish Government, “Taking Stock: Report on Progress towards a Cyber Resilient Scotland,” October 27, 2023, https://www.gov.scot/publications/taking-stock-report-progress-towards-cyber-resilient-scotland/documents/.

[7] Becki Clark, Emily Dorn, and Nash Consultancy, “Digital Connectivity and Climate Change in Scotland -Evidence Review Executive Summary 1.1 Aims,” 2024, https://doi.org/10.7488/era/4346.

[8] Climate Change Committee, “Adapting to Climate Change: Progress in Scotland” (Climate Change Committee, November 2023), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Adapting-to-climate-change-Progress-in-Scotland-Web.pdf.

[9] Ofcom, “Connected Nations: Scotland Report 2024,” December 5, 2024, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources.

[10] Climate Change Committee, “Adapting to Climate Change: Progress in Scotland” (Climate Change Committee, November 2023), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Adapting-to-climate-change-Progress-in-Scotland-Web.pdf.

[11] Rebecca Simmonds et al., “A Review of Interacting Natural Hazards and Cascading Impacts in Scotland Research Funded by the National Centre for Resilience,” 2022.

[12] Becki Clark, Emily Dorn, and Nash Consultancy, “Digital Connectivity and Climate Change in Scotland -Evidence Review Executive Summary 1.1 Aims,” 2024, https://doi.org/10.7488/era/4346.

[13] The Highland Council, “Digital Connectivity,” May 29, 2025, https://www.highland.gov.uk/meetings.

[14] BBC News, “ScotRail Trials Wi-Fi Using Elon Musk’s Starlink Satellites,” May 12, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czr8746x8ymo.

[15] Goldman Sachs, “The Global Satellite Market Is Forecast to Become Seven Times Bigger,” Goldmansachs.com, March 5, 2025, https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/the-global-satellite-market-is-forecast-to-become-seven-times-bigger.

[16] Climate Change Committee, “Adapting to Climate Change: Progress in Scotland” (Climate Change Committee, November 2023), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Adapting-to-climate-change-Progress-in-Scotland-Web.pdf.

[17] Digital Directorate, Scottish Government, “Scottish 4G Infill Programme: Progress Update,” October 28, 2025, https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-4g-infill-programme-progress-update/.

[18] Climate Change Committee, “Adapting to Climate Change: Progress in Scotland” (Climate Change Committee, November 2023), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Adapting-to-climate-change-Progress-in-Scotland-Web.pdf.

[19] Ofcom, “Shared Rural Networks Coverage Obligations,” 12, 2024, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources.

[20] The Highland Council, “Information and Data Strategy,” September 8, 2022, https://www.highland.gov.uk/downloads/file/26013/digital_strategy.

[21] Digital Directorate, Scottish Government, “A Changing Nation – How Scotland Will Thrive in a Digital World: Progress Report 2021 – 2024,” May 21, 2024, https://www.gov.scot/publications/changing-nation-scotland-thrive-digital-world-progress-report-2021-2024/documents/.

[22] Digital Directorate, Scottish Government, “Scottish 4G Infill Programme: Progress Update,” October 28, 2025, https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-4g-infill-programme-progress-update/.

[23] Climate Change Committee, “Adapting to Climate Change: Progress in Scotland” (Climate Change Committee, November 2023), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Adapting-to-climate-change-Progress-in-Scotland-Web.pdf.

[24] Ofcom, “Connected Nations: Scotland Report 2024,” December 5, 2024, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources.

[25] Climate Change Committee, “Independent Assessment of the Third National Adaptation Programme (NAP3)” (Climate Change Committee, March 2024), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Independent-Assessment-of-the-Third-National-Adaptation-Programme-NAP3.pdf.

[26] The Highland Council, “Information and Data Strategy,” September 8, 2022, https://www.highland.gov.uk/downloads/file/26013/digital_strategy.

[27] Rebecca Simmonds et al., “A Review of Interacting Natural Hazards and Cascading Impacts in Scotland Research Funded by the National Centre for Resilience,” 2022.

[28] Climate Change Committee, “Adapting to Climate Change: Progress in Scotland” (Climate Change Committee, November 2023), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Adapting-to-climate-change-Progress-in-Scotland-Web.pdf.

[29] Ofcom, “Shared Rural Networks Coverage Obligations,” 12, 2024, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources.

[30] Ofcom, “Shared Rural Networks Coverage Obligations,” 12, 2024, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources.

[31] Digital Directorate, Scottish Government, “A Changing Nation – How Scotland Will Thrive in a Digital World: Progress Report 2021 – 2024,” May 21, 2024, https://www.gov.scot/publications/changing-nation-scotland-thrive-digital-world-progress-report-2021-2024/documents/.

[32] Becki Clark, Emily Dorn, and Nash Consultancy, “Digital Connectivity and Climate Change in Scotland -Evidence Review Executive Summary 1.1 Aims,” 2024, https://doi.org/10.7488/era/4346.

Key Definitions

For the HCCROA, the terms risk and opportunity are used in specific ways. Risk refers to the potential for climate change to cause harm to people, nature, buildings, infrastructure, and communities. Opportunity refers to the potential for climate change to alter conditions in ways that could be advantageous for certain activities, sectors, or places in the Highland region, relative to current conditions. These opportunities may arise alongside significant risks and do not offset or negate them.

The assessment also highlights a second kind of opportunity: opportunities for action. The HCCROA refers to options for regional collaboration, which are distinct from opportunities arising directly from climate change. Greater benefits may be realised from coordinated action to reduce risks than from relying on limited advantages associated with changing climate conditions themselves.

 

Mental Health

Climate change is a difficult topic to engage with, and Highland Adapts appreciates that this report presents potentially upsetting information. Visit the Highland Mental Wellbeing website to learn about mental health services, information, and training available in the Highland region.

 

Project Funding and Disclaimers

Core Highland Adapts funding is provided by its partner organisations. The HCCROA was partially funded by the Scottish Government’s Climate Ready Regions Grant. The views expressed in this document are not necessarily those of the Scottish Government. Its members, servants or agents accept no liability whatsoever for any loss or damage arising from the interpretation or use of the information, or reliance upon views contained herein.

The HCCROA is a product of the Highland Adapts partnership, conducted with support from Joseph Perry Consulting, Highland Adapts partner organisations, and other regional and national contributors. The analysis, findings, and conclusions presented in the HCCROA do not necessarily reflect the views of Highland Adapts partner organisations. The HCCROA is provided for general information and should not be regarded as a substitute for professional or technical advice. Highland Adapts, Joseph Perry Consulting, the report authors, and report contributors accept no responsibility for any loss or damage arising from the use or interpretation of information contained within the HCCROA.

This page was last updated on 3 Mar, 2026.